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Abstract—As of today abuse is a pressing issue to participants
and administrators of Online Social Networks (OSN). Abuse in
Twitter can spawn from arguments generated for influencing
outcomes of a political election, the use of bots to automatically
spread misinformation, and generally speaking, activities that
deny, disrupt, degrade or deceive other participants and, or
the network. Given the difficulty in finding and accessing a
large enough sample of abuse ground truth from the Twitter
platform, we built and deployed a custom crawler that we use
to judiciously collect a new dataset from the Twitter platform
with the aim of characterizing the nature of abusive users, a.k.a
abusive “birds”, in the wild. We provide a comprehensive set
of features based on users’ attributes, as well as social-graph
metadata. The former includes metadata about the account
itself, while the latter is computed from the social graph
among the sender and the receiver of each message. Attribute-
based features are useful to characterize user’s accounts in
OSN, while graph-based features can reveal the dynamics of
information dissemination across the network. In particular,
we derive the Jaccard index as a key feature to reveal the
benign or malicious nature of directed messages in Twitter. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose such a
similarity metric to characterize abuse in Twitter.
1. Introduction
Users of OSN are exposed to abuse by other participants,
who typically send their victims harmful messages designed
to deny, disrupt, degrade and deceive among a few, as
reported by top secret methods for online cyberwarfare in
JTRIG [1]. In Twitter, these practices have a non-negligible
impact in the manipulation of political elections [2], fluctu-
ation of stock markets [3] or even promoting terrorism [4].
As of today, and in the current turmoil of fake news and
hate speech, we require a global definition for “abuse”. We
find the above definition from JTRIG to be able to cover
all types of abuse we find in OSN as of today. Secondly,
to identify abuse the Twitter platform often relies on par-
ticipants reporting such incidents of abuse. In other OSN
as Facebook this is also the case, as suggested by the large
number of false positives encountered by [5] in the Facebook
Immune System [6]. In addition, Twitter suspending abusive
* The first and main author of this work developed Trollslayer at INRIA
since 2015, published as https://doi.org/10.1109/SNAMS.2018.8554898.
participants can be seen as censorship, as it effectively
limits free speech of users in the Internet. Finally, user’s
privacy is today an increasing concern for users of large
OSN. Privacy often clashes with efforts for reducing abuse
in these platforms [7] because even disclosing metadata
that holds individuals accountable in such cases violates
the fundamental right to privacy according to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights [8]. In the same vein, and
back to the Twitter platform, we observe a constant trading
of individuals’ privacy for granting governments access to
private metadata. This endangers citizens well-being and
puts them into the spotlight for law enforcement to charge
them with criminal offenses, even when no serious criminal
offense has been committed [9].
The main contribution of this paper is a large-scale study
of the dynamics of abuse in a popular online social micro-
blogging media platform, Twitter. For that, we collect a
dataset where we annotate a subset of the messages re-
ceived by potential victims of abuse in order to characterize
and assess the prevalence of such malicious messages and
participants. Also, we find it revealing to understand how
humans agree or not in what represents abuse during the
crowd sourcing. In summary, the aim of the study is to
answer the following research questions (RQ):
RQ.1: Can we obtain relevant abuse ground truth from a
large OSN such as Twitter using BFS (Bread-First-Search)
sampling for data collection and crowd-sourcing for data
annotation? We show statistics about the dataset collected
and the annotated dataset respectively.
RQ.2: Does it make sense to characterize abuse from a
victim’s point of view? We provide a list of user attributes
(local) and graph-based (global) features that can character-
ize abusive behavior.
RQ.3: What are the dynamics of abusive behavior?
Does it appear as an isolated incident or is it somehow
organized? We show that the source of several messages
comes from an automated social media scheduling platform
that redirects Twitter users to a doubtful site about a fund-
raising campaign for a charity (considered as deceive in the
abuse definition we employ).
2. Victim-Centric Methodology
In order to collect data from Twitter we adapt the usual
BFS for crawling social media and start crawling data from
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a sufficiently representative number of accounts for our mea-
surement, which we we call the victims’ seed set. The first
half of accounts are likely victims, chosen independently of
any sign or trace of abuse in their public Twitter timeline
in order to account for randomness in the measurements.
The second half is selected based in their public timeline
containing traces or likelihood of abuse, namely potential
victims of abuse. Therefore, we define the seed set as
made up of potential victims and likely victims. We then
bootstrap our crawler, following the recursive procedure in
Algorithm 1, which collects messages directed towards each
of the seeds. If a message is directed towards or mentioning
two or more victims, we consider it several times for the
same message sender but with different destinations. We also
collect the subscription and subscriber accounts of sender
and receiver in the Twitter social graph, namely follower
and followee relationships.
2.1. Data model
Consider a seed set of nodes for forming a graph
Gs=(Vs, Es) containing the nodes in the seed set (victims)
and their potential perpetrators as the two entities defining
the edge relationships in Es. Given that Gs is a directed
graph made of vertices (Vs) and edges (Es) making up a
connection or defining a message sent among a pair of nodes
(u, v), we derive two specialized directed graphs with their
corresponding relationships, messaging or social follow in
the network.
Firstly, let Gf=(Vf , Ef ) be a directed graph of social
relationships where the vertices Vf represent users and a
set of directed edges Ef representing subscriptions:
Ef := {(u, v) | u publicly follows v}
Secondly, let Gm=(Vm, Em) be a directed messaging
multi-graph with a set of users as vertices Vm, and a set
of directed edges representing messages sent by user u
mentioning user v:
Em := {(u, v) | u messages v with a public mention}
Em models the tweets that are shown to users with or
without explicit subscription by the recipient to the sender.
Thus, these messages represent a vector for abusive behav-
ior.
To bootstrap our crawler, we start with the mentioned
seed set and run an adapted and recursive bounded breath-
first-search (bBFS) procedure on the Twitter input seeds to
cover up to a maximum depth maxdepth we pass as parame-
ter to it. In Algorithm 1 we summarize the operational mode
of bBFS.
2.2. Boundaries of the data crawl
The configuration of the crawler controls from where the
crawl starts and puts some restrictions on where it should
stop. The first one of such restrictions during the graph
Algorithm 1: Recursive bBFS procedure
input : seeds is the set of potential victims
input : newseeds is the set of new seeds from
follower of potential victims
param : maxFollows controls the number of
followers
param : maxdepth parameter controls the crawling
depth
function: F(x) := {y | (y, x) ∈ E} gets followers of
node x ∈ G
function: Add(x, y) := (x, y) | y ∈ F(x) maps
follower y to parent item x ∈ G
output : G=(V , E)
1 Procedure bBFS(seeds, depth,maxdepth)
2 if not seeds then
3 return G
4 newseeds ← {}
5 while seeds do
6 u ← seeds.pop
7 if |F(u)| ≤ maxfollows and depth ≤
maxdepth+ 1 then
8 while F(u) do
9 foreach v ∈ F(u) do
10 B ← Add(u, v)
11 G ← G ∪ B
12 if depth + 1 ≤ maxdepth then
13 newseeds.append(v)
14 depth ← depth + 1
15 return bBFS(newseeds,depth,maxdepth)
traversal is collecting incoming edges a.k.a followers in
Twitter when the number does not exceed an upper bound,
depending on the chosen maxfollowers as node popularity.
Secondly, the followers must be within a maximum depth
we call maxdepth in order to collect the related metadata in
the graph belonging to them.
For each node meeting the above constraints, we also
collect user account metadata as well as their respective
public timeline of messages metadata in Twitter; then we
start crawling the followers of nodes at depth 1, and next
depth 2 (followers of followers)and so on as set by the
parameter mentioned. In our dataset, we never go any further
than second degree followers to collect relationships among
users in the social graph crawled.
2.3. Data annotation
To annotate abuse we have developed an in-house crowd-
sourcing platform, Trollslayer 1, where we enlisted ourselves
and various colleagues to assist with the tedious effort of
1. https://github.com/algarecu/trollslayer
annotating abuse. However, we decide to enlarge our an-
notations with the support of a commercial crowd-sourcing
platform named Crowdflower, where we spent around $30 in
credit using a student data for everyone pack. In the crowd
sourcing process we account for scores collected from 156
crowd workers in Crowdflower and 7 trusted crowd workers
in Trollslayer, accounting to 163 crowd workers overall. In
these two platforms we display the same tweets and the
same guidelines to crowd workers that annotate messages.
Therefore, we are able to compute the global scores from
both platforms on the same tweets to end up with at least 3
annotations per tweet inthe worst case.
3. Dataset
So far we have judiciously collected a dataset from Twit-
ter to characterize abuse in Twitter. Using crowd workers we
obtain abuse ground truth. Next we extract relatively simple
features from the collected dataset. Given that the features
are largely based on data that is available in the proximity of
the potential victim, we aim to characterize the distribution
of abuse in an online micro-blogging platform from the view
of the victim. This also avoids the Big Data mining that
can only be effectively performed by large micro-blogging
service providers.
3.1. Statistics
Table 1 shows statistics about the dataset collected such
as the number of tweets directed toward the list of victims
in our seed set. In total, we account for 1648 tweets directed
to our seed set at depth 1. Then we show the same statistics
organized by depth in the recursive crawl performed to
obtain the dataset. Note that for the purpose of the statistical
analysis of the dataset and findings presented here, we will
only take into consideration nodes for which the social
graph has been fully collected. Due to Twitter Terms and
Conditions (TTC) we plan to make available and public only
the identifiers of the messages annotated but not the rest of
the information associated to the message, graph or private
information that identifies the crowd-workers.
Overall Depth 1 Depth 2 Depth 3
Es ∈ Gs directed to seed set 1648 1648 – –
Em ∈ Gm 773 162 734 896 36 487 1636
# with mentions 374 907 359 302 14 920 567
# with mentions & retweets 1878 1765 113 0
# with mentions & replies 1183 1026 292 284
# Ef ∈ Gf 27 017 119 25 042 892 1 636 161 0
TABLE 1: Basic statistics of the data crawled
3.1.1. Ground Truth. Following a voting scheme we ex-
plain here, we aggregate the votes received for each tweet
into a consensus score. We take a pessimistic approach to
ensure that a single vote is not decisive in the evaluation of
a tweet as abusive (e.g., unlike in Brexit affairs). That is,
if the aggregated score is between -1 and 1 the message is
considered undecided. The sum of scores will render a tweet
Figure 1: Agreement in ground truth by platform
as abusive in the ground truth when >1 and for acceptable
when <-1 . The final annotated dataset is comprised of
14 193 labeled messages, out of which 9809 are marked as
acceptable and 2469 as abusive and 1912 undecided.
Figure 1 shows the result of crowdsourcing abuse an-
notation when asking crowd-workers to mark messages as
either, abusive, acceptable or undecided. Agreement is high
in both platforms, even so for abusive messages, but as
expected lower than acceptable due to perfect disagreement
in a number of tweets as the ones we show in Table 2. There
are 8 tweets with perfect disagreement in Trollslayer out of
around 400 annotated, 27 in Crowdflower out of 720, and
25 in the aggregate out of 1912 mentioned above accounting
for aggregated voting of all annotations from both platforms.
Generally speaking, we see an upper bound of about 3.75%
disagreement for Crowdflower, 2% in Trollslayer and lower
bound of 1.3% among both, which highlights the importance
of employing a minimal set of trusted crowd workers in the
annotations (as we did with Trollslayer).
3.1.2. Agreement. To ensure agreement among crowd
workers is valid, we calculate the inter-assessor agree-
ment score of Randolph’s multi-rater kappa [10] among the
crowd workers with common tweets annotated. Similarly
to Cohen’s kappa or Fleiss’ Kappa, the Randolph’s kappa
descriptive statistic is used to measure the nominal inter-
rater agreement between two or more raters in collaborative
science experiments. We choose Randolph’s kappa over the
others by following Brennan and Predige suggestion from
1981 of using free-marginal kappa when crowd workers can
assign a free number of cases to each category being eval-
uated (e.g., abusive, acceptable) and using fixed-marginal
otherwise [11]. Our case considers different crowd workers
assigning a different number of annotations to each class or
category, which satisfies Randolph’s kappa requirement.
Note that in contrast to simple agreement scores, de-
scriptive statistics consider agreement on all three possi-
bilities, abusive, acceptable and undecided, thus providing
a more pessimistic measure of agreement among crowd
workers. There are number of descriptive statistics [12]
such as Light’s kappa and Hubert’s kappa, which are multi-
rater versions of Cohen’s kappa. Fleiss’ kappa is a multi-
rater extension of Scott’s pi, whereas Randolph’s kappa
generalizes Bennett’ S to multiple raters.
Given this setting, values of kappa can range from -1.0
to 1.0, with -1.0 meaning a complete disagreement below
random, 0.0 meaning agreement equal to chance, and 1.0
indicating perfect agreement above chance. According to
Randolph, usually a kappa above 0.60 indicates very good
inter-rater agreement. Across all annotations we obtain over-
all agreement of 0.73 and a a Randolph’s free-marginal of
0.59 which is about the recommended value in Randolph’s
kappa (0.60).
We inspect some of the annotations manually and dis-
cover that some scores are aggregated as undecided and
not as abusive due to their crowd-workers annotating as
undecided several of these tweets serially. That shows the
cognitive difficulty in the task of annotating abuse or the
tedious nature which we mention before (despite having
rewarded the crowd-workers in both platforms). On the
other hand, we noticed it is easy for crowd workers to spot
offensive messages containing hate speech or similar (which
in fact is abuse but only a subset according to the JTRIG
definition) but not so for deceitful messages or content.
4. Characterization of Abuse
This section shows that our method can indeed capture
all type of abusive behavior in Twitter and that while humans
still have a hard time identifying as abuse deceitful activity,
our latest findings suggest the use of network level features
to identify some abuse automatically instead.
4.1. Incidents
In several cases we find where there is perfect disagree-
ment among crowd workers, see Table 2; while in others
some of the actual abusive “birds” are just too difficult
to spot for humans given just a tweet but more likely if
we inspect an exhaustive list of similar messages from the
potential perpetrators’ timeline as shown in Table 3. In that
case the abusive “bird” is repeatedly mentioning the same
users through the special character “@” that Twitter enables
in order to direct public messages to other participants.
Besides, he repeatedly adds a link to a doubtful fund-raising
campaign.
We investigate the owner of the Twitter public profile
@jrbny: titled “Food Service 4 Rochester Schools”, which
is also related to a presumed founder @JohnLester and
both belonging to “Global Social Entrepreneurship”.
Firstly, we look into the JSON data of the tweet and
check the value of the field source in the Twitter API just to
confirm that it points to “https://unfollowers.com”, which in
turn redirects to “https://statusbrew.com/”, a commercial site
to engage online audiences through social media campaigns.
This confirms our suspicions about the nature of the profile
and its use for a public fundraising campaign. After a
quick inspection at the products offered by this social media
campaign management site, indeed we see that the site offers
an option to automatically “schedule content” for publishing
tweets online. In summary, this Twitter account is controlled
by humans but uses an automatic scheduling service to post
tweets and presumably follow/unfollow other accounts in
the hope of obtaining financial donations through an online
website. Secondly, expanding the shortened URL linked to
tweets as the ones from Table 3, we find out that indeed
the user is redirected to a donation website 2 from this
organization. The site is hosted in Ontario and belongs to the
Autonomous System AS62679, namely Shopify, Inc., which
reportedly serves several domains distributing malware. We
also acknowledge the difficulty in automating crowdsourc-
ing and characterization of the type of abuse deceive.
Finally, in order to highlight the effect of automated
campaign management tools as the ones used in the above
case, we crawled the same profile again in 2016-01-10
23:02:59, and the account had only 16690 followers com-
pared to the current 36531 as of January 2017, therefore
showing a successful use of semi-automated agents on Twit-
ter for fund-raising activities.
4.2. Features of Abusive Behavior
In order to characterize abuse we extract and build a set
of novel features, categorized as Attribute or Graph based,
which measure abuse in terms of the Message, User, Social
and Similarity. We apply Extraction, Transformation and
Loading (ETL) on the raw data in order to obtain the inputs
to each of the features in those subcategories. The most
readily available properties from the tweet are extracted.
Then we also capture a number of raw inputs in the tweet
that identify the features for a particular user. The next,
and more complex subset of features involve Social graph
metadata, which also enables the computation of the novel
Similarity feature subset, namely the Jaccard index (J ).
Table 4 summarizes the complete set of features we have
developed to evaluate abusive behavior in Twitter.
To visualize the data distribution of the most relevant
features from Table 4 in detail we show the complementary
cumulative distribution function (CCDF), which represents
the probability P that a feature having value of ≥ x in the
x axis does not exceed X in the y axis. We use the CCDF
in log-log scale to be able to pack a large range of values
within the axis of the plot.
In Figures 2 and 3 we compare the characteristic distri-
bution among abuse and acceptable content in our annotated
dataset. The dotted line here represents abusive while the
continuous one acceptable.
For the Attribute based features we notice the most
significant gap among acceptable and abusive is the Message
category, in particular the number of replies that a sender
user has authored, meaning that abusive “birds” reply more
often and seek controversy as part of their public speech in
Twitter. This makes sense from a “trolling” perspective if
2. Campaign site: www.pureheartsinternational.com
Time Text
2015-11-26 20:51:49 RT @Lo100La: @VABVOX @CoralieAlison @caitlin roper @MelTankardReist @MelLiszewski If youstand and wait somewhere, men just come and grab you
2015-11-23 20:41:52 Yes! Do not submit to the temptation, unless you want to experience an ice pick being driven slowlyinto your brain @enbrown @MattWelch
2015-11-29 11:59:25 @reynardvi @BasimaFaysal @avinashk1975 @SamBamDamdaMan People will literally kill to provethemselves ”virtuous”. Kill themselves too.
TABLE 2: Tweets with perfect disagreement in Both, Trollslayer and Crowdflower
Time Text Mentions Hashtags
2015-12-11 23:16:25
TY4follow @CPCharter @EJGirlPolitico @Daboys75!
My #socialentrepreneur #socialenterprise #socent @
https://t.co/SgTj5PXJ7H What do U do?
@CPCharter
@EJGirlPolitico
@Daboys75
#socialentrepreneur #so-
cialenterprise #socent
2015-12-11 23:16:27
TY4follow @CPCharter @EJGirlPolitico @Daboys75!
My #socialentrepreneur #socialenterprise #socent @...
https://t.co/3t1Kepp8Q5
@CPCharter
@EJGirlPolitico
@Daboys75
#socialentrepreneur #so-
cialenterprise #socent
TABLE 3: Timeline of potential abusive “bird” with deceitful tweets that are not labeled as abuse by humans
Metadata Feature Description
A
tt
ri
bu
te
ba
se
d
Message
# mentions mentions count in tweet
# hashtags hashtag count in the tweet
# retweets times a message has been reposted
is retweet (true/false) message is a repost
is reply (true/false) message is a reply
sensitive message links to external URL
#badwords number of swear words from Google [13]
# replies/# tweets of user fraction of replies to tweets
User
verified (true/false) sender account is verified by Twitter
# favorites # tweets marked as favorites by sender
age of user account days since account creation
# lists number of lists of sender
# messages/age of user tweets per day
# mentions/age of user mentions per day
# mentions/# tweets of user ratio of mentions to tweets
account recent check if account age is <= 30 days
G
ra
ph
ba
se
d Social
# subscriptionss followee count from public feed of sender
# subscriberss follower count to public feed of sender
# subscribers/age ratio of subscribers count to age of sender
# subscriptions/age ratio of subscriptions count to age of sender
# subscriptions/# subscribers ratio of subscriptions count to subscribers of sender
# subscribers/# subscriptions ratio of subscribers count to subscriptions of sender
reciprocity true if bi-directional relationship among sender and receiver in Gf
Similarity
J (subscriptionss, subscriptionsr) J of sender & receiver subscriptions
J (subscriberss, subscribersr) J of sender & receiver subscribers
J (subscriptionss, subscribersr) J of subscriptions of sender & subscribers of receiver
J (subscriberss, subscriptionsr) J of subscribers of sender & subscriptions of receiver
TABLE 4: Subsets of features by category
we consider that the definition of troll is a user that posts
controversial, divisive and at times inflammatory content.
Secondly, and to the contrary of what we expected, we
observe that humans agree on abuse when there are fewer
receivers or mentioned users, so the abuse is less likely to
be directed to multiple victims according to this. Otherwise,
Table 2 shows that no agreement is reached with multiple
targets if addressing users as a group, which can not be
correlated into a personal attack to the potential victim. We
see this as an indication of perpetrators sending disguising
messages to their victims in order to decrease the visibility
of their abusive behavior.
Finally, the distribution presented in the “badwords”
feature shows that at least one “badword” exist for many of
tweets annotated as abusive by our crowd workers, showing
a light tailed distribution with smaller probabilities for a
larger number of “badwords”. Firstly, this confirms that
human crowd workers are notably good at flagging abu-
sive content when it is related to the language itself and
secondly, that abusive messages flagged as such by humans
did not contain many “badwords”. That is also confirmed
by the fact that “bad words” have a negligible value in the
distribution of acceptable for such feature. On the contrary,
with hashtags we mostly observe acceptable messages in the
CCDF thus indicating that messages from our ground truth
flagged as abusive barely contain any hashtags.
We observe that some of the similarity features in
the graph-based category exhibit a distinguishable pattern
among acceptable and abusive messages. In particular, this
is the case for mutual subscribers and mutual subscriptions,
where the feature is calculated using Social graph metadata
from a pair of users, namely sender and receiver. The most
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
CCDF of number of hashtags
x
acceptable
abusive
(a) #hashtags in tweet
CCDF of number of mentions in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101
acceptable
abusive
(b) #mentions in tweet
CCDF of number of badwords
x
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
acceptable
abusive
(c) #badwords in tweet
CCDF of replies over users in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102
acceptable
abusive
(d) #Replies over tweets
CCDF of number of favourites tweets in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102 103 104 105
acceptable
abusive
(e) #favorites
CCDF of age_of_account in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102 103
acceptable
abusive
(f) Age of user account
CCDF of tweets_per_day in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102
acceptable
abusive
(g) # of tweets per day
CCDF of #lists in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102 103
acceptable
abusive
(h) #user lists
CCDF of #retweets in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102 103 104
acceptable
abusive
(i) # of retweets
Figure 2: Attribute based features
CCDF of followees count in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102 103 104 105
acceptable
abusive
(a) #Subsriptions
CCDF of followers count in log−log scale
log(x)
101 102 103 104 105
acceptable
abusive
(b) #Subscribers
CCDF of ratio of subscribers account age in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102
acceptable
abusive
(c) #Subscribers per day
CCDF of ratio of subscriptions to age of account in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102
acceptable
abusive
(d) #Subscriptions per day
CCDF of ratio of subscribers to subscriptions in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102 103
acceptable
abusive
(e) #Subscribers#Subscriptions
CCDF of ratio of subscriptions to subscribers in log−log scale
log(x)
100 101 102
acceptable
abusive
(f) #Subscriptions#Subscribers
CCDF of mutual followees in log−log scale
log(x)
100
acceptable
abusive
(g) J subscriptionssubscriptionr
CCDF of mutual followers in log−log scale
log(x)
100
acceptable
abusive
(h) J subscriberssubscriberr
CCDF of mutual followers−followees in log−log scale
log(x)
100
acceptable
abusive
(i) J subscriberssubscriptionr
CCDF of mutual followees−followers in log−log scale
log(x)
100
acceptable
abusive
(j) J subscriptionssubscriberr
Figure 3: Graph-based features
interesting CCDF is perhaps the mutual subscriptions one,
Figure 3g, in which there is a significant initial gap between
the social graph of acceptable and abusive messages in the
log probability (P (X > x)) in the y axis for nearly about
two-thirds of the distribution. Note that here the maximum
value of the axis runs from zero to 100 given that we
compute similarity using Jaccard. Considering that we did
not present crowd workers with information about the social
graph, it is quite surprising that some of these the graph-
based features show a characteristic pattern.
5. Related Work
The following section covers works similar to ours that
fall in the categories of the included subsections.
5.1. Graph-based
To characterize abuse without considering the content
of the communication, graph-based techniques have been
proven useful for detecting and combating dishonest behav-
ior [14] and cyberbullying [15], as well as to detect fake
accounts in OSN [16]. However, they suffer from the fact
that real-world social graphs do not always conform to the
key assumptions made about the system. Thus, it is not
easy to prevent attackers from infiltrating the OSN or micro-
blogging platform in order to deceive others into befriending
them. Consequently, these Sybil accounts can still create the
illusion of being strongly connected to a cluster of legitimate
user accounts, which in turn would render such graph-based
Sybil defenses useless. On the other hand and yet in the
context of OSN, graph-based Sybil defenses can benefit
from supervised machine learning techniques that consider a
wider range of metadata as input into the feature set in order
to predict potential victims of abuse [17]. Facebook Immune
System (FIS) uses information from user activity logs to
automatically detect and act upon suspicious behaviors in
the OSN. Such automated or semi-automated methods are
not perfect. In relation to the FIS, [5] found that only
about 20% of the deceitful profiles they deployed were
actually detected, which shows that such methods result in
a significant number of false negatives.
5.2. Victim-centric
The data collection in [18] was partially inspired by
the idea of analyzing the victims of abuse to eventually
aid individual victims in the prevention and prediction of
abusive incidents in online forums and micro-blogging sites
as Twitter. One observation from previous research [19]
that we have embedded into some of our features is that
abusive users can only befriend a fraction of real accounts.
Therefore, in the case of Twitter that would mean having
bidirectional links with legitimate users. We capture that
intuition during data collection by scraping in real-time the
messages containing mentions to other users (@user) and
thus we are able to extract features such as ratio of follows
sent/received, mutual subscribers/subscriptions, etc.
5.3. Natural Language Processing and text based
Firstly, previous datasets in this area are not yet released
or in their infancy for verification of their applicability
as abuse ground truth gold standard. The authors of [20]
claim to outperform deep learning techniques to detect hate
speech, derogatory language and profanity. They compare
their results with a previous dataset from [21] and assess the
accuracy of detecting abusive language with distributional
semantic features to find out that it does largely depends
upon the evolution of the content that abusers post in the
platform or else having to retrain the model.
Finally, it is worth mentioning we in our feature set do
not include sentiment analysis inputs as [22] did; simply
because we are interested in complex types of abuse that
require more than just textual content analysis. Additionally,
we have noticed that while some words or expressions may
seem abusive at first (e.g., vulgar language), they are not
when the conversation takes place between participants that
know each other well or are mutually connected in the social
graph (e.g., family relatives).
5.4. Other datasets
Following the above classifications, we compile a num-
ber of previous works [23], [24], [25], [26] that collected
a large portion of the Twitter graph for its characterization
but not really meant for abusive behavior. Note some of
these datasets can provide some utility from their social-
graph for characterization of abusive behaviour but they
are either anonymized or we are not able to get access to
them. Naturally, social-graph metadata is not available due
to restrictions imposed by Twitter Terms and Conditions
(TTC) for data publishing. We also find the Impermium
dataset, from a public Kaggle competition [27] that provides
the text of a number of tweets and labels for classifying such
messages as an insult or not. This can be useful for textual
analysis of abuse (only for non-subtle insults), which can
be supported by application of NLP based techniques, but it
does not contain any social graph related metadata that we
use in our characterization of abuse. Besides, as the tweet
identifiers from the Imperium dataset are anonymized, it is
not possible to reproduce data collection.
6. Conclusion
We concluded that identifying abuse is a hard cogni-
tive task for crowd workers and that it requires employing
specific guidelines to support them. It is also necessary to
provide a platform as we created or questionnaires to ask
crowd workers to flag a tweet as abusive if it falls within any
of the categories of the guidelines, in our case the 4 D’s of
JTRIG, deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive. As a crowd worker
provides a non-binary input value from acceptable, abusive,
undecided to annotate tweets from Em, the latter option
is important; even with relatively clear guidelines, crowd
workers are often unsure if a particular tweet is abusive. To
further compensate for this uncertainty, each tweet has been
annotated multiple times by independent crowd workers (at
least 3). We highlight the reason for the disagreement we
encountered by listing a few tweets in Table 2. Table 3
contains metadata from a user that consistently tweets from
a third-party tweet scheduling service.
Additionally, using the set of features presented here one
could provide semi-automated abuse detection in order to
help humans to act as judges of abuse. Filtering “badwords”
is not quite enough to judge a user as abusive or not, so in
order to provide a better context to human crowd workers
one could imagine coupling the score of attribute based
features with those graph-based features that can provide
an implicit nature of the relationships between senders and
receivers of the content, thus flagging messages or users as
abusive “bird” (or not) in Twitter. This will also present an
scenario where abuse is a less tedious and self-damaging
tasks for human crowd workers reading abusive content
during annotation.
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